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A number of recent studies have analysed the electoral impact of political corruption. Hanley & Sikk (2014) 
show that corruption is a crucial condition explaining the success of anti-establishment parties in Central and 
Eastern Europe. Other studies have shown that widely publicised cases of political malfeasance such as the UK 
expenses scandal in 2009 affected the re-nomination rates and electoral fortunes of incumbent candidates (Pattie 
& Johnston 2012). This paper brings together these two streams of literature by looking at the impact of 
corruption (perception) on candidate turnover. We study party lists in 9 EU member states in Central and 
Eastern Europe and analyse two aspects of candidate turnover. The analysis is based on a newly created data set 
that covers most of the elections during the last two decades in the region. We hypothesize that high or 
increasing levels of corruption create incentives for existing political parties to rejuvenate their candidate lists – 
getting rid of established (and ostensibly corrupt) politicians and bringing in new candidates with no previous 
political experience Secondly, we focus on incumbent governing parties, hypothesizing that high or increasing 
levels of corruption make the revision of candidate lists particularly urgent for those with executive 
responsibilities. We find that contrary to our initial expectations, increased levels of corruption lead to a 
decrease in candidate turnover. The effect is only evident and statistically significant among governing parties; 
turnover in non-governing parties is best explained by party size and changes in popularity. 
 
Key words: Elections, Voting, Candidate, Political Parties, Europe (Central and Eastern), Governance 
 
 
 
Acknowledgment 
Research for this paper was funded by the European Commission’s FP7 ANTICORRP project. 
  
2 
 
Over the last two decades, research on political corruption has become abundant in political 
science scholarship and a growing number of studies investigates its determinants, working 
mechanisms, and effects (see e.g. Heywood 1997; Heidenheimer and Johnston 2011). In 
analysing the effects of corruption, particular attention has been devoted to questions of 
vertical accountability, i.e. the way in which voters hold corrupt politicians accountable and 
thus the electoral impact of corruption. The majority of studies focuses on the impact of 
corruption scandals on the performance of candidates, usually in the form of case studies of 
individual countries or elections.
1
 Examples range from congressional elections in the United 
States (Peters and Welch 1980; Banducci and Karp 1994; Welch and Hibbing 1997; Basinger 
2013), national elections in the United Kingdom (Pattie and Johnston 2012; Larcinese and 
Sircar 2013), Italy (Chang, Golden and Hill 2010; Asquer 2013; 2014) and Brazil (Ferraz and 
Finan 2008) to state elections in Bavaria (Kauder and Potrafke 2014) and mayoral contests in 
Spain (Costas-Pérez, Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro 2012). Overwhelmingly, these studies 
find that corrupt parties and politicians are punished by voters, but considerably less 
frequently and less severely than might be expected. However, research has until now largely 
failed to systematically address the question of how parties respond to potential punishment 
before facing voters at the polls. 
Voters’ perception of corruption in political parties has been demonstrated to be an 
important factor in determining party support and voting decisions (Deegan-Krause, Klasnja 
and Tucker 2011; Slomczynski and Shabad 2012; Ecker et al. 2015). Furthermore, high and 
increasing levels of (perceived) corruption can be seen as crucial for the break-through of 
new, anti-establishment parties in Central and Eastern Europe (Hanley and Sikk 2014) which 
due to their novel set of candidates can often boost more credibility than others (Bågenholm 
2013a). At the same time, some of the abovementioned studies have also shown that scandals 
affect politicians’ re-nomination rates and can thus exact the rejuvenation of parties’ 
candidate pools. It follows that high or increasing levels of corruption might not only create 
favourable conditions for the emergence of genuinely new parties (i.e. those with a high share 
of new candidates) but also provide significant incentives for existing political parties to 
refresh their candidate lists by bringing in new candidates with no previous experience in 
political office. 
The aim of this paper is to put this notion to the test by studying the effect of corruption on 
candidate turnover on party lists in 9 Central and East European (CEE) EU member states 
                                                 
1 Large-N comparative studies such as Bågenholm (2013b) remain the exception. 
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during the last 20 years. We begin the paper with an overview of studies on candidate 
(de-)selection and list turnover and its relationship with corruption. Then, we outline our 
empirical approach and the new data set on which we test the effects of levels and change of 
corruption on general candidate turnover, as well as focusing in on candidate turnover in 
governing parties. We find that changes in corruption perception have a significant impact on 
candidate turnover, but the effect only affects governing parties. However, contrary to our 
initial hypothesis we discover that candidate turnover decreases rather than increases in 
response to increased levels of perceived corruption. We conclude with a discussion and 
possible explanations of this surprising finding. 
Mechanisms of candidate turnover 
Regular turnover of parliamentary elites is a defining characteristic of (and arguably a 
necessity for) any democracy. While legislative turnover rates are naturally influenced by 
parties’ performance in elections, they also depend on how many members of parliament run 
again and who parties decide to nominate (Matland and Studlar 2004; Rahat 2007). Turnover 
of candidates, however, is a largely understudied subject so far. Although it tends to be 
addressed as part of the abovementioned case studies to some extent, the literature generally 
focusses on the re-nomination of incumbents rather than previously unsuccessful candidates – 
a fact that can largely be attributed to the simultaneous focus on elections in single mandate 
districts or very small multi-mandate districts rather than list-based electoral systems.
2
 
Incumbents usually only occupy a fraction of places on party lists as parties regularly 
nominate more candidates than they could reasonably get into office in any given election. 
Thus, there is considerable scope for candidate turnover even if the majority of incumbents is 
re-nominated (a trend visible in most Western democracies; see also discussion below). 
One can generally identify two different types of candidate turnover, which are similar to 
those identified by Matland and Studlar (2004) in their study of legislative turnover. 
Candidate turnover can be due to voluntary resignation of candidates, i.e. the decision not to 
run again for personal reasons (e.g. age, family, general dissatisfaction with party/office, or to 
pursue a career outside of politics).
3
 Although some factors – such as redrawing of 
constituency boarders and the introduction/phasing out of more beneficial retirement options 
– have been shown to increase the rate at which incumbents retire from office (Banducci and 
                                                 
2 Exceptions are Kreuzer and Pettai (1999; 2003) and Shabad and Slomczynski (2004) who look at several countries and 
elections, yet even they are eventually mostly concerned with inter-party mobility of incumbents between elections. 
3 Party-specific voluntary list turnover can also be caused by political tourism, i.e. candidates’ deliberate decision to run for 
another party in the next election. Nevertheless, this has no effect on general levels of candidate turnover. 
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Karp 1994), party list turnover should be significantly less affected by this as such 
(dis)incentives almost only relate to incumbents and legislative turnover otherwise tends to be 
comparatively stable (albeit on country-specific levels; Mattland and Studlar 2004). 
On the other hand, party list turnover can also be caused by the involuntary removal of 
candidates from party lists. Thereby, a candidate is either denied renomination by the party or 
is forced to give up their list place due to a scandal. Health issues or death present another 
form of involuntary removal from party lists. As mentioned above, comparative studies of 
candidate list turnover are still very rare so that providing a preliminary analysis of wider 
patterns of candidate turnover is part of the rationale of this paper.  
Studies of candidate selection in Western Europe and the United States have shown that 
most incumbent deputies generally seek renomination by their party and tend to be nominated 
again without problems (see chapters in Gallagher and Marsh 1988; Matland and Studlar 
2004). At the same time, targeted deselection of incumbents – denial of renomination or 
forced retirement – appears to be a very rare phenomenon. Yet as Matland and Studlar (2004) 
argue, it may only appear rare as ‘incumbents who face a serious danger of being deselected 
[by the party leadership or through intra-party defeat] may opt for “voluntary” retirement 
instead’ (ibid. 97). This notion is supported by a number of studies, most prominently those 
of the UK expenses scandal in 2009. Eggers and Fisher (2011), Pattie and Johnston (2012) 
and Larcinese and Sinclair (2013) find that MPs who were implicated in the scandal retired at 
a significantly higher rate before the 2010 general elections compared to other MPs. 
Although other factors – such as amount of media reporting on individual deputies’ 
wrongdoings and electoral support in the previous election – are also shown to have 
contributed to the higher retirement rate, these appear to have rather amplified the effects of 
the scandal. Basinger (2013) and Banducci and Karp (1994) find a similar pattern with regard 
to incumbents’ retirement from Congress following scandals as affected deputies were 
significantly less likely to seek re-nomination than others. This pattern is somewhat less clear 
with regard to Italy. While Chang, Golden and Hill (2010) find that there is no statistical 
difference in the percentage of deputies retiring following accusations of corruption and 
unaffected legislators between 1948 and 1994, Asquer (2013; 2014) finds that there was at 
least a lower renomination rate for deputies charged with corruption before the 1994 
elections. Although it is not always clear whether it was incumbents’ own decision not to run 
again or they were (informally) pressured into doing so, it becomes clear that occurrences of 
political malfeasance play an important role in legislative turnover by involuntary exit. 
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However, the question remains to what extent such findings on the renomination and 
retirement can be applied to general party list turnover. First, it needs to be reiterated that 
studies have so far focussed almost exclusively on plurality voting systems with 
comparatively decentralised systems of candidate selection. List-based electoral systems tend 
to be more centralised and exclusive, giving more power to central party organisations or 
regional leaders in the selection process (Hazan and Rahat 2010). Second, incumbent 
candidates seeking renomination and ‘ordinary’ candidates differ in so far as the cost of 
removing the former is far greater. Incumbents, even those who have been involved in a 
scandal, still tend to receive more votes than entirely new candidates. As Larcinese and 
Sinclair (2013) show, parties also did not remove MPs whose voting behaviour frequently 
deviated from the party line due to their ability to win elections. Ordinary list candidates on 
the other hand, are considerably less costly to remove and their replacement might even be 
beneficial for the party. Finally, ordinary candidates might themselves be considerably less 
interested in running again than incumbents given costs of campaigning and uncertainty 
about the outcome. 
Candidate turnover and corruption: Incentives for rejuvenating party lists 
As mentioned above, candidate turnover is still greatly understudied and findings on 
legislative turnover are not fully applicable. Such problems notwithstanding, in this paper we 
offer a first step towards explaining candidate turnover by considering the relationship 
between candidate turnover and corruption. 
Previous studies have shown that corruption has electoral consequences and plays an 
important role in voters’ decisions to vote for a particular party – although other factors 
naturally play an equally if not more significant role (Deegan-Krause, Klasnja and Tucker 
2011; Slomczynski and Shabad 2012; Ecker et al. 2015). Voters are overall more likely to 
vote for parties they perceive as less corrupt (or not corrupt at all).
4
 While there are a 
multitude of measures parties might employ to this end and increase their vote share, the most 
straightforward way is to ‘replace the rascals’. The presentation of a novel set of candidates 
untainted by political scandals has been linked the success of new anti-corruption parties in 
Europe (Bågenholm 2013a). Furthermore, voters tend to see individual politicians rather than 
political parties as such as corrupt (Slomczynski and Shabad 2011), so that replacing old and 
ostensibly corrupt candidates would appear to be an effective way to disassociate a party 
from the wrongdoings of previous representatives. Yet, ‘newness’ can also present a general 
                                                 
4 A mechanism somewhat weakened by individual party loyalty or political leaning. 
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strategy for parties to break into the electoral market or to increase their vote share (Sikk 
2012). Thus, even if a party or its candidates have not been involved in any scandals, voters’ 
perceptions of rising levels of corruption (and increased awareness of the potential for 
malfeasance by established politicians) can still present an incentive for parties to change 
their line-up. 
The question remains whether such a strategy would also be feasible for political parties. 
Contrary to most previous studies on the relationship between corruption and incumbent 
(re)nomination, we are interested in candidate turnover in list-based (rather than plurality) 
electoral systems. In such systems, candidate selection tends to be more centralized, thus 
giving party leaders more influence over candidate (de)selection (Hazan and Rahat 2010). 
Centralization of candidate selection is further concentrated in the hands of party leadership 
in younger and less institutionalised democracies, which we are particularly interested in as 
our data stems from Central and Eastern Europe. Here, the lack of established party structures 
which could otherwise restrict leadership autonomy and the strategic complexity produced by 
the high number of competitors strengthens party leaders and should lead to more centralized 
selection procedures (Field and Siavelis 2008, 630-32). Therefore, the rejuvenation of 
candidate lists could be seen as a feasible strategy to counter risk of declining electoral 
fortunes. 
Parties should try to anticipate the influence of corruption perception on voter choice and 
renew their candidate base in order to be punished less at the polls. Parties who held 
responsibility in government and/or nominated the Prime Minister should generally be under 
greater pressure to renew their candidate lists. As argued by Ecker et al. (2015), voters 
evaluate government parties not only on the basis of economic performance (economy, 
unemployment rate etc.) but also on other dimensions, including the existence and level of 
corruption. This should particularly be true in the countries of CEE where corruption tends to 
be among the most important issues for voters (ibid., Singer et al 2011). Irrespective of 
corruption scandals among other (opposition) parties, voters will attribute blame for high 
levels of corruption first and foremost with governing parties
5
; it is these parties that not only 
have access to public goods but also the power to prevent its misuse for private gain. Thus, 
governing parties will be under greater pressure to anticipate potential punishment by the 
electorate and can be expected to renew their party lists to a greater extent than other parties. 
                                                 
5 Admittedly, this mechanism is likely mediated by individual voters’ political/party preferences (Eckert et al 2015; see also 
Anderson and Tverkova 2003). 
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Before proceeding to the test of this hypothesis, it should be mentioned that the effect of 
corruption perception on involuntary list turnover coincides with a specific type of voluntary 
list turnover identified by Asquer (2014). She shows that politicians frequently leave 
(governing) parties that are perceived as corrupt and join new or different formations in order 
to have a better chance of re-election. Such instances of ‘party tourism’ however only affects 
party-specific turnover rates, not overall candidate turnover.  
Finally, note that in addition to being a potentially important consequence of political 
corruption, candidate turnover is also a relevant variable for the study of other issues.  For 
example, Kreuzer and Pettai (1999) argue that lowering levels of candidate turnover can be 
seen as an indicator of parties’ institutionalisation and development of effective recruitment 
channels (which favour stability). In a similar vein, Sikk & Köker (n.d) and Barnea &  Rahat 
(2011) use it as an indicator of party novelty, the use of which could improve our 
understanding of party system dynamics, promising more reliable electoral volatility indices. 
Data and variable coding 
In our analysis, we use a novel data set on electoral candidates and party lists from 9 Central 
and East European democracies and 39 elections between and 1996 and 2014 (see Table 1), 
i.e. all current EU member states in the region with the exception of Romania and Croatia 
where the data has been more difficult to analyse or obtain, respectively.
6
 Candidate lists and 
electoral results were obtained from public sources, primarily those available online (e.g. the 
websites of national electoral commissions, parliaments and ministries). As far as available, 
we incorporated data from the ‘Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in Post-
Communist Europe’ database at the University of Essex. Data from the Comparative 
Manifesto Project and the Political Science Data Yearbook were used to complement the data 
set and code variables on government participation, electoral performance and party change. 
Overall out data set contains close to 200,000 candidate-election combinations.  
To calculate candidate turnover between elections, we developed a computerised matching 
function implemented in R which compares individual candidates on party lists within a 
given pair of subsequent elections. The analysis of candidate novelty extends to more recent 
elections than that of candidate drop-outs as due to a high number of organizational changes 
among parties, drop-out is defined in terms of candidates in t-1 not running in t.
7
  
 
                                                 
6 We plan to include these countries as well as some of the missing earlier elections in future. 
7 Otherwise we would have to overlook parties that disappeared, merged or split. 
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Table 1. Elections included in the data set and current analysis 
Election 
number BG CZ EE HU LT LV PL SI SK 
1   1992 1990 
  
1991   
2   1995 1994 1996 1995 1993   
3 1994* 1996 1999 1998 2000 1998 1997  1994 
4 1997* 1998 2003 2002 2004 2002 2001 2000 1998 
5 2001 2002 2007 2006 2008 2006 2005 2004 2002 
6 2005 2006 2011 2010 2012 2010 2007 2008 2006 
7 2009 2010 - 2014 - 2011 2011 2011 2010 
8 2013 2013 - - - 2014 - 2014 2012 
9 2014 - - - - - - - - 
* Only parties that entered parliament. 
    - included in both new candidate and dropped candidate analysis 
    - included in either new candidate (later elections) or dropped candidate analysis (earlier elections) 
 
Dependent variable: Candidate Turnover 
Candidate turnover can be thought of in two distinct ways – the percentage of new 
candidates who did not compete in the previous election as well as the percentage of 
candidates who competed in the previous election but failed to run again (dropouts). 
Although similar, the two measures reflect different processes – namely the recruitment of 
new candidates on the one hand and the removal of old candidates on the other – which do 
not necessarily go hand-in-hand. It is therefore sensible to use both indicators and compare 
the results; our hypotheses should generally apply equally to both indicators. Some 
adjustments to the raw percentages of new and dropped candidates were necessary for our 
statistical analysis; these are outlined in more detailed at a later point in this paper. 
Independent variables 
Corruption. We use Transparency International’s corruption perception index (CPI) to 
operationalize corruption. Although the index neither reflects actual/‘real’ levels of 
corruption nor allows us to account for particular corruption scandals or allegations against 
parties, it reflects the general level of voters’ concern over the issue which makes it a 
meaningful indicator in terms of our study (see also Hanley and Sikk 2014). In our models, 
we include CPI scored in two ways. First, we include the change in the CPI score over the 
past four years (i.e. the length of a typical legislative term). Our rationale here is that a trend 
should represent the public relevance and pressure for political parties better than the average 
CPI score over the last parliamentary term (cf. Eckert et al. 2015). Following Hanley and 
Sikk (2014), we also include the CPI score for the year before the election – given that data is 
9 
 
collected in the year preceding the headline year, this is more appropriate than taking the CPI 
score of the election year; particularly as some of the elections took place in the first half of 
the year. 
Government participation. Particularly in the early years of democratization the new 
democracies in CEE often experienced several governments during one parliamentary term, 
making it difficult to code which parties participated in the government, and should according 
to our hypotheses be under greater pressure to rejuvenate their candidate base. We therefore 
follow a midway approach similar to Bågenholm (2013b), i.e. parties which were part of the 
government at least 18 months before the election are coded as a government parties whereas 
all others are not coded as such.
8
 
Party size/vote share. In our analysis, we control for party size operationalized as a party’s 
vote share. Slomczynski and Shabad (2011) and Ecker et al. (2015) find that party supporters 
are less likely to see their preferred party as corrupt or punish them at the polls. 
Consequently, larger parties (those with a larger voter base) will be under less pressure to 
rejuvenate their candidate list as they can count on their supporters’ vote regardless. 
Furthermore, larger parties also tend to be associated with larger organisational structures (or 
more complicated ones in the case of alliances). We enter the variable as its common 
logarithm (base of 10) to ensure that the relative differences in party sizes is reflected more 
accurately.
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Change in electoral support. In addition we include a variable on change electoral support, 
operationalized as the ratio of votes in current election to the votes in previous election. 
Although changes in a party’s vote share may be seen as a potential effect of candidate 
turnover, we include it here as a proxy for change in parties’ broad support levels. We 
thereby expect that parties with decreasing support will be more likely to try and counter the 
loss of support by bringing in new candidates. Similar to parties’ vote share, we include the 
variable in logged form to equalize similar degrees of increase and decrease in vote shares.
10
 
Unemployment. Last, we include a variable change in the unemployment rate in the three 
years preceding the election. The unemployment rate is an important economic indicator and 
area in which voters will evaluate parties, particularly those that participated in the 
                                                 
8 Unfortunately, this strict criterion meant that in some cases (particularly in most recent Czech elections) no party could be 
coded as governing. 
9 For example, the logarithm ensures that a party with 20 percent of votes is equidistant from parties with 10 and 40 percent 
of votes, rather than 0 and 40 or 10 and 30 percent of votes. 20 percent is substantively closer to 40 than 0 and 30 is 
substantively closer to 20 than 10. 
10 Otherwise, if a party doubled its vote share the absolute value of this variable would be twice as large compared to a party 
which lost half of its votes. 
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government. Furthermore, sharp rises in unemployment have been shown to be present a 
favourable condition for the breakthrough of anti-establishment parties (Hanley and Sikk 
2014) which established parties will try to counteract. Due to the great variation in the rate 
across countries and the fact that even high levels of unemployment can quickly become 
accepted as the norm (ibid.), we include the change rather than the absolute level of 
unemployment as our indicator. 
Overall candidate turnover in CEE 
We begin by looking at overall levels of candidate turnover in CEE. Figure 1 shows general 
trends in turnover by country by plotting the share of new candidates (those who did not 
contest in the previous election) for each election year. We can see that overall candidate 
novelty remains relatively stable in most countries with a very slight downward trend (fewer 
new candidates) in some countries. 
Figure 1: Overall share of new candidates 
 
Nevertheless, looking at these overall trends alone might be misleading as it includes 
many extra-parliamentary parties, which have limited political relevance together with the 
more established parties where we would expect significantly lower degrees of candidate 
novelty. Figure 2 focusses on candidate turnover in parties which received at least 5% of 
votes in the respective election (roughly a typical electoral threshold). Furthermore, we 
restrict our analysis here to the top 25% of party lists, i.e. the top quartile of a party’s 
candidates in constituencies (national lists in Estonia, Lithuania and Hungary 2014) are 
compared with the full candidate lists (of all parties) in the previous election.
11
 New 
                                                 
11 To remedy the fact that parties ran oversized lists (listing up to twice as many candidates as seats in parliament; e.g. 
Estonia 1995), we define ‘full lists’ and ‘top 25 per cent’ using the district magnitude of electoral districts or the number of 
seats in parliament where national lists were used. 
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candidate percentage thus refers to percentage among top 25 percent who did not contest the 
preceding election. Dropped candidate percentage – analysed below – on the other hand 
refers to the percentage among the top 25 percent of candidates who did not contest in the 
following election. We defined top 25 per cent based on party rankings in districts (or 
national lists, where available) – based on preference votes (post-election list placement) 
where open lists used. 
Figure 2: Share of new candidates (top 25%), parties with V% > 5% 
 
Among the leading candidates in main parties, turnover has slightly decreased during the 
last two decades, yet there are strong country-specific variations. Some of these are caused by 
early elections which restricted parties’ ability to recruit new candidates (e.g. Poland 2007, 
Latvia 2011, Slovakia 2012, Bulgaria 2014), while others can be traced back to the 
breakthrough of genuinely new parties which fielded almost exclusively new candidates (see 
Sikk 2005). If we only look at established political parties, i.e. those we could code as 
contesting subsequent elections using codes from the Manifesto Project
12
, the trend towards 
less new candidates is somewhat more pronounced (see Figure 3). The average share of new 
candidates decreases from about 50% in the early years to 30% in the most recent elections. 
Nevertheless, significant variation remains within and between countries.  
                                                 
12 Unfortunately, some of the established parties – particularly electoral alliances with sometimes small shares of new 
candidates – are excluded here as they are assigned a different party code in the CMP dataset. 
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Figure 3: New candidates in established parties by country (top 25%) 
 
Note: only parties that were not coded as new in Volkens et al. 2014 that received at least 5% of votes. The fine black line show loess trend. 
Figure 4: Dropouts by country (top 25%), parties with at least 5% of votes in t-1 
 
Finally, the trends for dropouts, i.e. candidates who did not run again in the subsequent 
election, appear to be fairly similar to those found for novelty (see Figure 4). Note that these 
two measures of candidate turnover can diverge as we are comparing the top quartile of a 
candidate list in one election to all full candidate lists in the subsequent election. Even if all 
top candidates drop out (e.g. due to scandals), it is unlikely that they will all be replaced with 
new candidates instead of candidates that ran already in the previous election. 
Candidate turnover and corruption 
We now turn to the analysis of the relationship between candidate turnover and perception of 
corruption. Before proceeding with our statistical models, it needs to be noted that we mostly 
looked at parties that contested both in a pair of elections (and where it was reasonably 
straightforward to code party continuity); this was necessary so that a variable on vote change 
(see above) could be included. Furthermore, for reasons already outlined above we restricted 
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our analysis of candidate turnover – in the form of both new and dropped candidates – to the 
top 25 per cent of candidate lists.  
Figure 5. Corruption perception, perception change and new candidate % (V>5% only) 
 
 
Figure 5 shows the general relationship between two variables related to corruption 
(corruption perception index and its change in four years before an election) and mean new 
candidate percentage for main parties (V > 5%). There seems to be a weak negative 
relationship between CPI / CPI change and new candidate percentage as there are more larger 
markers in the bottom-left quadrant of the scatterplot (high and increasing corruption), but 
there are also outliers.
13
 The relationship is weak and needs to be analysed in depth looking at 
individual parties. In preliminary analyses we discovered that candidate novelty is strongly 
dependent on other variables, particularly party size that we need to add as control variables. 
We also discovered a very clear relationship between candidate change and time between 
elections (see Figure 2) – with early elections producing much more limited candidate change 
than elections held after full term. Also, for reasons that are not of primary interest here, we 
noticed differences in candidate novelty levels between different countries.  
As a result, we adjusted candidate turnover (our dependent variable) by the overall mean 
for parliamentary parties in a country (across all elections). This is because turnover rates 
seem to vary across countries (see above) and the adjustment helps to control for the potential 
effects of different electoral systems or other dependent variables that we have not included 
in our models. A further adjustment was necessary to account for the fact that the time gap 
                                                 
13 Note, however, that the two of the prominent outliers in that quadrant (SK 2012 and LV 2011) were early elections – that 
tend to have lower levels of candidate novelty – held less than two years after the preceding one. 
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between elections varied. We divided the difference between a party’s candidate turnover and 
the national average and divided that by time between elections. The most typical gap of four 
years was set at 1 so that in effect all turnovers were normalized to as if the gap between 
elections was four years. Hence, the dependent variable was adjusted as follows:
14
 
𝑛𝑐𝑝𝑎𝑑𝑗 =  
𝑛𝑐𝑝𝑖 − 𝑛𝑐𝑝̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
0.25𝑡
 
where ncpi stands for the new candidate percentage for party i, 𝑛𝑐𝑝̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ for national average for 
all parliamentary parties in all elections and t for years between the pair of elections. 
Table 2. Determinants of candidate novelty (all parties elected to the parliament)a 
 
(1) (2) 
CPI change t-1 – t-4 2.65 7.01 
 
(5.85) (5.00) 
CPIt-1 -0.06 1.53 
 
(3.14) (2.66) 
Unemployment change t-1 – t-3 -0.29 -1.08
* 
 
(0.71) (0.61) 
log10Vt -15.12
** -17.88*** 
 
(7.20) (5.74) 
log10(Vt/Vt-1)  
16.54 
  
(10.73) 
Constant 14.40 -2.73 
 
(16.10) (14.01) 
Observations 185 115 
R2 0.03 0.15 
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.11 
Note:*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 (standard errors in parentheses) 
a top 25% of candidates 
When we look at all parliamentary parties together (Table 2), corruption or change in 
perception does not affect candidate novelty. Party’s vote share has the most consistent effect 
in the two specified models while change in party support does not have a statistically 
significant effect. New candidate percentage tends to decrease by about 15-18 per cent as the 
vote share of parties is increased ten times (as we use log to the base of 10 with the party vote 
share). In addition, increasing levels of unemployment tend to decrease candidate novelty, 
when controlling for the change in party support. Following Hanley & Sikk (2014), who 
argue that new parties often break through under favourable economic conditions, we can 
speculate that under difficult economic situations parties may want to stick to tried and tested 
candidates and expect their voters to prefer them to new candidates (that are more likely 
                                                 
14 To keep the regression models parsimonious and simple, we chose to transform the dependent variable. The 
transformation involved variables that are of limited interest here (and should not affect the governing and non-governing 
parties differently) and does not make the interpretation of results more difficult (we chose to leave party size as an 
independent variable for that reason).  
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under decreasing candidates). However, the effect is very marginal and model fits are rather 
poor, especially in the more encompassing model 1 in Table 2.
15
 
Table 3. Determinants of candidate novelty (governing and other parliamentary parties)16 
 
Dependent variable: 
 
New candidate %  Dropped candidate % 
 
(1) 
Governing 
parties 
(2) 
Other  
parliamentary  
parties 
(3) 
Governing 
parties 
(4) 
Other  
parliamentary  
parties 
CPI change t-1 – t-4 13.07
*** 4.91 12.32* 0.70 
 
(4.22) (5.47) (6.18) (4.54) 
CPI t-1 0.08 -3.84 -1.13 -4.03 
 
(2.21) (2.84) (3.79) (2.43) 
Unemployment change t-1 – t-3 1.06
* 0.39 0.02 1.03* 
 
(0.53) (0.70) (0.72) (0.58) 
log10Vt -23.68
*** -42.69*** -32.09*** -27.29*** 
 
(7.39) (8.96) (10.99) (7.53) 
log10(Vt/Vt-1) 4.90 19.83
* -25.24*** -15.57** 
 
(9.22) (11.80) (8.96) (7.55) 
Constant 7.24 57.54*** 28.50 45.23*** 
 
(14.50) (18.17) (22.48) (14.77) 
Observations 63 61 60 60 
R2 0.31 0.34 0.28 0.31 
Adjusted R2 0.25 0.28 0.21 0.25 
Note:*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 (standard errors in parentheses) 
 
When we run similarly specified models separately for governing parties and other 
parliamentary parties, we see striking differences in the coefficients (see Table 3, see 
Appendix for lists of governing and non-governing parties). Most importantly for our present 
purposes, change in corruption perception has a remarkable effect, but only for governing 
parties. However, the effect is opposite to our hypothesized direction – instead of recruiting 
new candidates to improve their presumably tarnished image, candidate novelty decreases as 
perceived levels of corruption decrease (i.e. CPI increases). For each one point change in CPI 
over the four preceding years (roughly corresponding to an electoral cycle), the governing 
parties include 18 per cent more new candidates. The effect of party size still remains 
statistically highly significant – ten times increase in party size leads to 21 percentage points 
fewer new candidates.  
The predicted share of new candidates is close to national average (just 3.3 percent lower) 
for a governing party with 10 percent of votes if CPI score increases by one point.
17
 If CPI 
                                                 
15 We included two models as the vote change is not available for some parties – including new parties (the ratio is not 
defined if lagged vote share is zero) and parties for which continuity is difficult to code. Note that we coded continuity for 
most governing parties below manually where it was missing in the CMP data set (Volkens et al 2014). 
16 One party/election was excluded from some of the models due to extreme leverage: (1) Vienotiba and ZZS 2011 (both 
Latvia), (3) TPP 2008 (Lithuania) and (4) Smer 2010 (Slovakia). None of the models suffers from heteroscedasticity. 
17 Assuming mean level of CPI, no change in unemployment and the vote share.  
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decreases by one point (considerable increase in corruption), the share of new candidates for 
a similar party is well below the national average (30 percentage points lower). The candidate 
novelty scores for a party with a near-majority (40% votes) are considerably lower: -18 
and -44 compared to national average, respectively. Candidate drop-out is likewise dependent 
on CPI change with a similar but slightly lower coefficient, possibly because of the overall 
lower model fit. Drop-out also depends much more significantly on party vote change – those 
that ended up gaining votes were much less likely to lose top candidates.
18
 As in all other 
models, party size has very strong impact on candidate dropout (with candidates of larger 
parties less likely lose top candidates). 
Remarkably, in contrast to governing parties, change in corruption perception does not 
affect non-governing parliamentary parties. Still, interestingly and somewhat puzzlingly, 
candidate novelty and dropout among non-governing parliamentary parties is better explained 
by our set of independent variables – particularly party size and changes in popularity. Note 
that new parties are excluded here, as vote ratio is not defined for them. Their exclusion is 
intentional as (a) new parties have been shown to benefit from rising perceptions of 
corruption (Hanley & Sikk 2014) and (b) we wish to maintain a focus on existing 
parliamentary parties in this paper. Candidate novelty of new parties that entered the 
parliament was markedly higher (57.2 percent) than that of previously existing ones (35.4 
percent).
19
 Combining genuinely new and existing parties would conceptually blur the 
picture.  
  
Discussion and conclusion 
Our main finding here – that increasing perception of corruption lead to lower candidate 
novelty among governing parties – contradicts our initial hypothesis and begs an explanation. 
Several reasons can be proposed, the detailed analysis of which is beyond the scope of this 
paper – a mixed methods approach that combines more sophisticated quantitative models 
                                                 
18 We find this asymmetry fascinating yet puzzling – why does candidate novelty not depend on changes in party’s 
popularity, yet dropouts are clearly lower for parties gaining support and higher for those that become less popular. The 
latter effect also applies for non-governing parties, but, notably the candidate novelty of non-governing parties increases 
with increasing support. 
19 The mean candidate novelty for governing parties was even lower  at 31.8 percent. New parties defined as those for which 
continuities compared to previous election were missing in Volkens et al 2014. The low average indicates that new parties 
such defined include some which included many candidates in the running previously. We plan to review new parties in 
future, but such “false discontinuities” are sometimes difficult to correct due to frequent organizational changes. Note that 
what constitutes a new party is a contested and debated issue in political science (see Barnea & Rahat 2011, Litton 2013 and 
Sikk & Köker n.d.). 
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with in-depth case studies of carefully selected party/election dyads might be most useful.
20
 
Firstly, under increasing perceptions of corruption, the government parties try to play it safe 
as they may trust that even corrupt candidates can often do better in elections than entirely 
new faces (see studies of UK expenses scandal). Rising levels of corruption may implicate 
the top leadership of parties, but not necessarily all candidates – particularly those with lower 
list placement may not be perceived as corrupt. That may, indeed, explain the statistically less 
robust result for candidate drop-outs – some of the governing parties presumably see many of 
their previous top candidates being removed and replaced by those with previously lower list 
placements – rather than by entirely new candidates. Indeed, it is likely that new candidates 
may not necessarily want to join lists of governing parties if corruption perception is 
increasing. Parties may have to stick to the candidates that they have as they cannot (rather 
than will not) rejuvenate when they stagnate under increasing corruption.  
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Appendix 
Descriptive statistics of variables for models 1-4 in Table 3. 
  
New/dropped 
candidate indexa 
CPI change CPI 
Unemployment 
change 
log10V log10(V change) 
Model 1 N 63 63 63 63 63 63 
 
Mean -15.1 0.1 4.7 0.4 1 -0.2 
 
St. Dev. 18.2 0.6 1 4.1 0.4 0.3 
 
Min -69.4 -1 3.4 -6.1 -0.1 -1.2 
 
Max 31.6 1.2 6.7 11.4 1.6 0.3 
Model 2 N 61 61 61 61 61 61 
 
Mean -7.5 0.04 4.9 0.3 1.1 -0.1 
 
St. Dev. 20.7 0.5 1 3.9 0.4 0.3 
 
Min -93.5 -1 3.5 -6.1 -0.2 -1.2 
 
Max 32.2 1.2 6.7 11.4 1.7 0.5 
Model 3 N 60 60 60 60 60 60 
 
Mean -9.1 0.1 4.5 0.9 1.2 -0.2 
 
St. Dev. 25.7 0.6 0.9 4.6 0.3 0.3 
 
Min -100.2 -1 3.4 -6.1 0.7 -1.2 
 
Max 47.4 1.2 6.7 11.4 1.7 0.3 
Model 4 N 60 60 60 60 60 60 
 
Mean -3.4 0.1 4.9 0.3 1.1 -0.1 
 
St. Dev. 16.6 0.5 1 3.9 0.3 0.3 
 
Min -37.6 -1 3.5 -6.1 0.6 -1.2 
 
Max 35.6 1.2 6.7 11.4 1.6 0.5 
a
 adjusted by national mean for parliamentary parties and time between elections (see text) 
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Governing parties (new candidate analysis) 
 
parties 
2001.BG ODS 
2005.BG DPS, NDSV 
2009.BG DPS, KZB, NDSV 
2013.BG GERB 
2002.CZ CSSD 
2006.CZ CSSD, KDU-CSL 
2003.EE RE 
2007.EE K, RE, RL 
2011.EE IRL, RE 
2002.HU FIDESZ-MDF, FKGP 
2006.HU MSZP, SZDSZ 
2010.HU MSZP 
2000.LT LCS, LKDP, TS 
2004.LT UdL 
2008.LT LICS, LSDP 
2012.LT LRLS, TS-LKD 
2002.LV LC, TB-LNNK, TP 
2006.LV LLP-LC, TP, ZZS 
2010.LV PVL-TB-LNNK, Vienotiba, ZZS 
2001.PL AWSP 
2005.PL SLD 
2007.PL PIS 
2011.PL PO, PSL 
2008.SI DeSuS, NSi, SDS, SLS 
2011.SI LDS, SD 
2002.SK SDKU, SDL, SMK-MPK 
2006.SK ANO, KDH, SDKU-DS, SMK-MPK 
2010.SK HZDS, SNS, Smer 
2012.SK KDH, MOST-HID, SDKU-DS, SaS 
 
Non-governing parties (new candidate analysis) 
 
parties 
2005.BG KZB, ODS 
2009.BG ATAKA 
2013.BG ATAKA, DPS 
2002.CZ KSCM, ODS 
2006.CZ KSCM, ODS 
2010.CZ CSSD, KDU-CSL, KSCM, ODS, SZ 
2013.CZ CSSD, KDU-CSL, KSCM, ODS, TOP 09 
2003.EE IL, K, MD 
2007.EE IRL, SDE 
2011.EE EER, K, RL, SDE 
2002.HU MSZP, SZDSZ 
2010.HU FIDESZ-KDNP 
2004.LT TS 
2012.LT LSDP, PTT 
2006.LV JL, PCTVL, TB-LNNK 
2001.PL PSL 
2005.PL LPR, PIS, PO, PSL, SRP 
2007.PL PO, PSL 
2011.PL PIS 
2008.SI LDS, SD, SNS 
2011.SI DeSuS, SDS, SLS, SNS, ZARES 
2002.SK HZDS 
2006.SK HZDS, Smer 
2010.SK KDH, SDKU-DS 
2012.SK SNS, Smer 
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Governing parties (dropped candidate analysis) 
 
parties 
1997.BG ODS 
2001.BG DPS, NDSV 
2005.BG DPS, KZB, NDSV 
2009.BG GERB 
1998.CZ CSSD 
2002.CZ CSSD, KDU-CSL 
1999.EE RE 
2003.EE RE, RL 
2007.EE IRL, RE 
1998.HU FIDESZ, FKGP 
2002.HU MSZP 
2006.HU MSZP 
2000.LT BSDA, NS 
2004.LT LICS, UdL, VNDS 
2008.LT LICS, LRLS, TS-LKD 
1998.LV LC, TB-LNNK, TP 
2002.LV LC, LPP, TP, ZZS 
2006.LV JL, TB-LNNK, ZZS 
2010.LV Vienotiba, ZZS 
1997.PL AWS 
2001.PL SLD-UP 
2005.PL PIS 
2007.PL PO, PSL 
2008.SI LDS, SD 
1998.SK SDK, SDL, SMK-MPK, SOP 
2002.SK ANO, SDKU, SMK-MPK 
2006.SK HZDS, SNS, Smer 
2010.SK KDH, MOST-HID, SDKU-DS, SaS 
 
Non-governing parties (dropped candidate 
analysis) 
 
parties 
2001.BG KZB, ODS 
2005.BG ATAKA 
2009.BG ATAKA, DPS 
1998.CZ KSCM, ODS 
2002.CZ KSCM, ODS 
2006.CZ CSSD, KDU-CSL, KSCM, ODS, SZ 
2010.CZ CSSD, KDU-CSL, KSCM, ODS, TOP 09 
1999.EE IL, K, MD 
2003.EE K, MD, RP 
2007.EE EER, K, RL, SDE 
1998.HU MSZP, SZDSZ 
2002.HU SZDSZ 
2006.HU FIDESZ-KDNP 
2000.LT TS 
2008.LT LSDP, PTT 
2002.LV JL, PCTVL, TB-LNNK 
1997.PL PSL 
2001.PL LPR, PIS, PO, PSL, SRP 
2005.PL PO, PSL 
2007.PL PIS 
2008.SI DeSuS, SDS, SLS, SNS, ZARES 
1998.SK HZDS 
2002.SK HZDS, KDH, Smer 
2006.SK KDH, SDKU-DS 
2010.SK SNS 
 
 
